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PHILLIPS v. PHILLIPS

If Maryland should enact legislation to eliminate the
procedural problem in the administration of theft offenses,
it appears that a provision similar to either the Massachusetts law or the draft Model Penal Code would be the
most simple and effective choice.
CHARLES CAHN,

II

Use Under Void Parol Grant Ripening Into
Easement By Prescription
Phillips v. Phillips'
Theodore Phillips and his wife filed a bill of complaint
against his mother, Mrs. Margaret Phillips, and his brother,
Vernon Phillips, to enjoin the obstruction by defendants of
a driveway on the adjoining land of the defendants, the
use of which plaintiffs claimed by prescription. The defendants claimed that the use made of the driveway was
permissive and not adverse, and the Chancellor granted
the defendants' prayer for a directed verdict. From a decree dismissing the bill, the plaintiffs appeal.
Mrs. Phillips and her husband, since deceased, owned
a tract of land improved by a dwelling, where they-resided. In July, 1935, they conveyed Lot 20, carved out of
the tract, to Theodore and his wife. In 1941, the remainder
of the tract, Lot 18, was conveyed to Mrs. Phillips and her
son, Vernon, as joint tenants. Prior to 1935, there was an
existing driveway located on what became Lot 18, near
the dividing line between Lot 18 and Lot 20. Theodore
constructed a house and separate garage on Lot 20, and
moved in during November, 1935. He testified that at the
time of the conveyance of Lot 20, before the construction
of the garage began, his mother suggested that he face the
garage towards the existing driveway to save the expense
of a new driveway. He suggested that perhaps someday
she might sell the property and then the driveway would
be closed to him. She replied:
"'Aw fiddlesticks, you know better than that. I'll
never leave here until they. carry me off the place.
You can use that driveway and you can always use it
and nobody will ever stop you from using it, so you
go ahead and build your garage there.' "2
1215 Md. 28, 135 A. 2d 849 (1957), conc. op. 37, 136 A. 2d 862.
*Ibid,32.
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He paved the driveway and used and maintained it at his
own expense since 1935. For about 15 years, he used it to
transport building materials used in his business, and to
store them there, contrary to his mother's wishes. In
December, 1955, Theodore received a letter from his mother
directing him to vacate the driveway, as some day the
property would belong to his brother Vernon, and she did
not want any misunderstanding after she died. Neither
she nor Vernon had ever before objected to his use of the
driveway.
The Chancellor found that the use was open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, for more than 20
years, but had been neither adverse nor under a claim of
right. The Court of Appeals held that on the facts of the
case, the use was adverse and under a claim of right, and
remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court
said that while generally a permissive use can never ripen
into an easement by prescription, this rule does not apply
where there has been an attempt to grant an easement
which is void because of the Statute of Frauds. In such
cases it is a question of fact whether the oral grant is
intended to convey an irrevocable right or a mere license.
The Court pointed to the mother's statement as clearly
indicating that Theodore's use would never be interfered
with by her or anyone else. They also felt that the fact that
he built the garage so that it faced the driveway, and paved
and maintained it, was inconsistent with a belief on his
part that permission could be withdrawn at any time.
This is the first Maryland case clearly holding that a
use under a void attempt to grant an easement was adverse
and not permissive, although the rule was stated with approval in two previous Maryland cases. In Clark v.
Henckel,3 a case where the parties attempted to create
mutual cross easements in an alley, part of which was on
plaintiff's land and part on defendant's, by oral agreement,
the Court of Appeals recognized the rule that the use under
an oral agreement to create an easement was adverse, but
seemed to base their decision upon part performance of
the agreement taking it out of the Statute of Frauds. In
Lichtenberg v. Sachs,4 plaintiff and his predecessors had
been using a road over defendant's land for over 50 years,
and the defendant claimed the use was permissive. The
Court felt that there was no evidence that the use was ever
permissive, but said:
326 A. 1039 (Md., 1893).
4200 Md. 145, 88 A. 2d 450 (1952).
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"If they got any permission to use the Robinson
property, they probably thought it was irrevocable.
An oral permission, believed to be irrevocable but unenforceable by reason of the Statute of Frauds, may
evidence a claim of right and indicate that user was
adverse and not permissive."5
The rule applied in the Phillips" case seems to have7
been approved in every case where the issue has arisen.
As one writer has said:
"The authorities appear to be unanimous in supporting the rule that the parol conveyance of an easement, though void under the statute of frauds, will, if
followed by user for the period of prescription, establish a prescriptive title to the easement. At least no
decision can be found which in any manner questions
this proposition." 8
The cases are also unanimous in emphasizing that it is
not the invalid grant which is the basis of the title, but
that the invalid grant evidences that the use was under a
claim of right and not merely permissive.' Most cases state
the rule as above - i.e., use under an oral agreement, void
because of the Statute of Frauds, is adverse and under a
claim of right. However, many cases state the rule in terms
of a presumption that the use is adverse where it is under
an oral agreement. In the first place, most authorities agree
that where there is use for the prescriptive period, in the
absence of any agreement, it is presumed to be adverse
5Ibid, 154.
6215 Md. 28, 135 A. 2d 849 (1957).
1 See cases cited in 17A AM. JuR. 702, Easements, §86; 13 Ann. Cas. 925;
13 8L. R. A. (N.S.) 991; and 4 TIFFANY, RmA PROPRTY (3rd ed., 1939) §1196.
Note in 13 L. R. A. (N.S.) 991.
0The case frequently cited for this is Ashley v. Ashley, 4 Gray (70 Mass.)
197, 199 (1855), where Chief Justice Shaw said:
"Here the question was whether the right of way could be established
by twenty years' adverse, continued and uninterrupted enjoyment. The
judge, against the objection of the defendant, held that this evidence
was competent, not because a right of way can be created by a parol
grant but to show that the plaintiff commenced the actual use of the
way under a claim of right."
He then went on to say, p. 200:
"This principle is, that possession under a claim of title, with or
without deed, is adverse; and that principle applies as well in cases
of easements, incorporeal hereditaments, and interests in land as to
the title to land itself."
In Klein v. De Rosa, 137 Conn. 586, 79 A. 2d 773, 775 (1951), the court said:
"Even in a case where the use began as the result of an Ineffective or
invalid grant, that fact does not negate its adverse character but tends
rather to emphasize that It was made under a claim of right."
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and under a claim of right.1" But in many cases, where the
evidence shows that use began under an oral agreement,
the courts, instead of stating the rule in terms of void
attempt to grant an easement, say that the use is still presumed to be under a claim of right, and the burden of proof
is upon the party claiming that the use is permissive."
This approach is illustrated by a Kentucky case, Talbott v.
Thorn, 2 where the court said:
"And from the fact of the verbal agreement, and
the user for 15 years, the presumption arises that the
user was a matter of right; and the burden is upon the
vendor to rebut this presumption, and to show that
the user was, notwithstanding the grant, permissive
13
only, which the appellant has failed to do in this case.1
This approach could theoretically make a difference in a
close case, where the nature of the agreement was not clear.
However, it is doubtful that there is any practical difference between the two approaches, as in almost all of the
cases where use under an oral agreement has extended
for the prescriptive period, the courts either hold that the
agreement was an attempt to create an easement and not
a mere revocable license, or that the presumption that the
use was under a claim of right was not overcome. Under
either approach the courts seem to require clear evidence
that the use was under a mere license after the prescriptive
period has run. 4
If there are any difficulties in this area, they are in
determining whether the oral agreement was an attempt
to create an easement, or was a mere revocable license.
10
17A AM. Jun. 692, Easements, §77. See also Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md.
317, 41 A. 2d 66 (1945) ; Lyle v. Holman, 238 S. W. 2d 157, 160 (Ky., 1951),
where the court said:
"'Where the claimant has shown such long continued use, it will be
presumed the use was under a claim of right, and the burden is upon
the owner of the servient estate to show that the use was merely
permissive'."
"Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 152 P. 2d 585 (1944) ; Coventon
v. Seufert, 23 Or. 548, 32 P. 508 (1893) ; Lechman v. Mills, 46 Wash. 624,
91 P. 11 (1907) ; Wortman v. Stafford, 217 Mich. 554, 187 N. W. 326 (1922).
1291 Ky. 417, 16 S. W. 88 (1891).
Ibid, 89.
' Auxier v. Horn, 213 S.W. 100 (Mo., 1919), is one of the few cases where
the claim was made that 'the oral agreement was an attempt to create an
easement, but the court held it a mere license, revocable after the prescriptive period had run. The claimant of the easement had originally been the
grantor of the land over which he claimed the easement and had made the
statement that he was sorry he had not retained an easement when he
conveyed the land. In Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 41 A. 2d 66 (1945),
where the grantees were given a "license" to use a private road, it was
held that the use was merely permissive, and no easement was obtained
by more than 20 years use of the road.
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The usual test mentioned in the cases is what was the
intention of the parties.'5 However, some of the cases seem
to place more importance on the intent of the grantee in
the void grant than that of the grantor,0 and this is perhaps reasonable, as the important element is whether the
use was under a claim of right. The two important factors
taken into consideration by the courts in determining the
intention of the parties are the language used and the
nature of the use.' 7 The cases go quite far in holding that'
certain language or acts indicated an intent to create an
easement and not a mere revocable license. For example,
in Wells v. Parker,' a trespass action, the plaintiff's predecessor had told the defendant: "'You have a perfect right
to use water from that well. I give you permission; . . .' "19
Pursuant to this statement, the defendant had been crossing the plaintiff's land and taking water from a well there
for longer than the prescriptive period. The court held that
this language was sufficient for the jury to find an intention
to grant an easement, which became perfected by prescription. In Blaine v. Ray,2" the plaintiff brought suit to
1 In Wells v. Parker, 74 N. H. 193, 66 A. 121, 122 (1907), the court said:
"The intention in accordance with which the possession was given and received, though different from the legal effect of the transaction, is the important thing, .. ." In Jewett v. Hussey, 70 Me. 433, 436-7 (1879), the test
was expressed this way: "The distinction is, whether I grant you a right
over or upon my property to use as your own or as my own - as an enjoyment and privilege belonging to you or as belonging to me." In Arbuckle v.
Ward, 29 Vt. 43, 53 (1856), the court based the distinction upon whether
the permission was perpetual:
"But the mere fact of showing that the use begun by permission of
the landowner is not alone sufficient to defeat the prescription. For if
the permission was a perpetual gift, or an unlimited gift or permission
to use, and continued for fifteen years the right is perfected."
See also Lechman v. Mills, 46 Wash. 624, 91 P. 11 (1907) ; Outhwaite v.
Foot, 240 Mich. 327, 215 N. W. 331 (1927).
16In Blaine v. Ray, 61 Vt. 566, 18 A. 189, 190 (1889), the court said:
"It does not matter that the defendant and his grantors did not all, or
any of them, know that the orator and his grantor claimed to own the
right to take the water by gift." In Klein v. De Rosa, 137 Conn. 586, 79 A.
2d 773 (1951), the court emphasized the fact that the claimant of the
easement believed she had a right and never sought permission from
anyone.
17In Schmidt v. 'Brown, 226 Ill. 590, 80 N. H. 1071, 1073 (1907), it is said:
"Whether the agreement is to operate as a license or as the basis for a
claim of right depends primarily upon the language employed by the
parties." In Stearns v. Janes, 12 Allen 582, 584 (94 Mass., 1866), the court
said:
"But the character of the use or occupation depends upon the language used and the manner of the enjoyment. If the language is such
as to create only a license or a lease, the enjoyment is regarded as
permissive, and not as of right, and no title is acquired by it."
74 N. H. 193, 66 A. 121, (1907).
1Ibid, 121.
,61 Vt. 566, IS A. 189 (1889).
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restrain interference with his alleged easement to cross
defendant's land and take water from defendant's well.
The facts showed that the defendant's predecessor had
informed the plaintiff's predecessor that he thought a supply of water could be procured by digging in a certain
place, and if he would dig there and find water, he might
have it and conduct it to his own land. The plaintiff's
predecessor then asked if he might have a deed or written
contract giving him the right to take the water, but this
was refused. The plaintiff and his predecessor had been
taking the water for longer than the prescriptive period,
and the court held that he had an easement to conduct
water from the defendant's land.2 '
There is no requirement of consideration for an oral
agreement or permission to be construed as a void attempt
to create an easement, and just as many cases as not are
ones where there was no consideration.2 2 Although the
lack of consideration does not appear to be a factor influencing the courts to construe an oral agreement as a mere
revocable license in cases where the use under it has continued for the prescriptive period, the presence of consideration will usually be mentioned as one of the factors
indicating an intention to create an easement and not a
revocable license.23 In fact, it appears highly unlikely,
where there is consideration paid for a use which has
extended for the prescriptive period, that the courts will
construe the oral agreement as a mere revocable license.
Other facts which the courts take into consideration in
determining whether or not an oral agreement was an attempt to create an easement are those indicating what type
of use was made of the claimed easement. Although many
cases point to various acts of the adverse user as shedding
light on the original intention of the parties in making the
oral agreement,24 some cases would place primary importance upon the subsequent acts of the user as indicating a
claim of right irrespective of the original intention or lan2 Morrison v. Fellman, 150 Misc. 772, 271 N. Y. S. 436 (1934), is another
case where the plaintiff, who was the claimant of the easement, requested
that it be put in writing, but was refused, and the court still held that the
plaintiff had acquired an easement by prescription.
2 See Stearns v. Janes, 12 Allen (94 Mass.) 582 (1866), where the court
placed a parol gift and parol contract upon equal footing.
23Balestra v. Button, 54 Cal. App. 2d 192, 128 P. 2d 816 (1942) ; Checketts
v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 152 P. 2d 585 (1944); Lechman v. Mills, 46
Wash. 624, 91 P. 11 (1907) ; McKinzle v. Elliott, 134 Ill. 156, 24 N. E. 965
(1890) ; Wortman v. Stafford, 217 Mich. 554, 187 N. W. 326 (1922).
This is the approach of the Court of Appeals in Phillips v. Phillips, 215
Md. 28, 135 A. 2d 849 (1957).
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guage of the parties.2 5 This is reasonable, since the basis
of the doctrine is not that the use for the prescriptive period
renders an invalid grant valid, but that the invalid grant
is merely an indication of use under claim of right and not
mere revocable permission." Some specific factors mentioned by the courts as indicating whether use was under
a claim of right and whether the intention of the original
agreement was to grant an easement or a mere license are:
whether the user publicly claimed an easement; 27 whether
or not an annual rent was paid for the use; 28 whether the
right of way was specifically defined; 29 whether or not the
claimed right of way was fenced;"0 whether the user ever
sought any permission subsequent to the agreement;"'
whether the user spent money and labor upon the claimed
easement; 2 and generally, whether the grantee has used
the claimed easement "as if it were legally conveyed." 3
It might be said that the same factors, indicating whether
or not use was adverse and under a claim of right in cases
where the use did not have its inception in an oral agreement, are applicable in cases where the use began under
such agreement, either to show the nature of the agreement
or to show whether or not the use is under a claim of right
irrespective of the language of the agreement.
Where there has been use under a void oral agreement
for the prescriptive period, the courts have been very
reluctant to call it permissive under a mere revocable
license. Perhaps this is used as a way to get around the
rule that mere licenses are revocable, even where money
and labor has been spent by the licensor, which is the
2 In Coventon v. Seufert, 23 Ore. 548, 32 P. 508, 510 (1893), the court
seems to express this idea:
"It is no objection to granting an easement by prescription that the
same was originally granted or bargained by parol. That the use began
by permission does not affect the prescriptive right, if it has been used
and exercised for the requisite period, under a claim of right, ...
If the use of a way is under a parol consent given by the owner of the
servient tenement to use it as if it were legally conveyed it is a use as
of right.... The plaintiffs have used the ditch as if it had been legally
conveyed to them, - that is, they have exercised such acts of ownership over it as a man would over his own property; and the court must
presume, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the
settlement was a parol consent or transfer . . . of the right to use

the ditch, and hence it was a use as of right."

Supra, n. 9.

Wortman v. Stafford, 217 Mich. 554, 187 N. W. 326 (1922).
28
20

Ibid.
Ibid.

0Ibid.

v. De Rosa, 137 Conn. 586, 79 A. 2d 773 (1951).
Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 152 P. 2d 585 (1944).
8 Stearns v. Janes, 12 Allen (94 Mass.) 582 (1866).
8Klein
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However, even if it seems

far fetched to call these oral agreements attempts to create
easements which fail because of the Statute of Frauds,
especially in those cases where an agreement in writing
was asked for and refused, 5 yet the vast majority of cases,
where there has been open and continuous use for the
prescriptive period under such an oral agreement, have
refused to hold that the use was merely permissive and
revocable.
JOHN C.

ELDRIDGE

The Power Of Equity To Bind Unborn Persons
To A 'Sale For Partition
Hardy v. Leager1
The complainant-appellee and his sister had been tenants in common in the fee of certain realty. Subsequently
the complainant's sister died, devising to complainant a
life estate in all of her property with the remainder, after
the satisfaction of certain pecuniary bequests, in equal
shares to the complainant's surviving children or, upon
failure of such survivors, over, in equal shares, to such
children of certain named cousins as should survive the
complainant. Thus the complainant became the owner in
fee of a one-half undivided interest in the land with a life

"

Some cases have confused the rule that use under a void parol grant is
under a claim of right and may ripen into an easement by prescription, with
the minority rule in this country that where the licensee has spent money
or labor in the exercise of his license, the licensor Is estopped from revoking it. In Gyra v. Windler, 40 Colo. 366, 91 P. 36, 37 (1907), where there was
a claimed parol gift to use a right of way, which continued for the prescriptive period, the court said:
"The following appears to be the rule in such cases: 'But though a
right of way cannot be gained by the parol agreement of him who
creates it, yet where, under such agreement, the owner of the dominant
estate used the way thus created for 20 years, -and the same was
acquiesced in by the owner of the servient estate, It was held to be
such an exercise of the way, under a claim of right, as to gain thereby
a prescriptive right to the same'."
Then, the court, without apparently realizing It is announcing two different rules, states, p. 38:
"While a parol license to enter upon real estate is generally revocable
at the pleasure of the licensor, it is settled that such license cannot
be revoked when the licensee, on the faith of the license, with the
knowledge of the licensor, has expended his money and labor In carrying out the object of the license. This is on the principle of estoppel'."
Blaine v. Ray, 61 Vt. 566, 18 A. 189 (1889) ; Morrison v. Fellman, 150
Misc. 772, 271 N. Y. S. 436 (1934).
2212

Md. 565, 130 A. 2d 737 (1957).

